Abstract-Using data on Indian firms, I provide evidence on how electricity prices affect a firm's industry choice and productivity growth. I construct an instrument for electricity price as the interaction between coal price and the share of thermal generation in a state's total electricity generation capacity. I find that in response to an exogenous increase in electricity price, firms switch to less electricity-intensive production processes within narrowly defined industries, reduce their machine intensity, and have lower output and productivity growth rates. Thus, electricity constraints may limit a country's growth by leading firms to operate in industries with fewer productivity-enhancing opportunities.
I. Introduction
I NFRASTRUCTURE is widely perceived to be important for development. The World Bank's single largest business line is spending on infrastructure, which more than quadrupled from $5.2 billion in 2000 to $25.1 billion in 2011 (World Bank, 2012) . While there is an active literature on the effects of infrastructure on various facets of economic development, 1 relatively little research has been conducted on how infrastructure affects the behavior of firms. Since firms are an important engine of growth in the economy and infrastructure is an essential input in firms' production processes, identifying how firms respond to infrastructure is crucial for understanding the microfoundations of growth in developing economies.
This paper examines the responses of firms to electricity costs in India. Using panel data on manufacturing firms, I study how electricity costs influence firms' decisions on which industries to operate in and firm productivity growth. In most developed countries, industrial users pay lower prices for electricity compared to other users because the cost of supplying electricity to industrial users is typically lower (IEA, 2012) . However, in India, politicians' desire to curry favor with households and farmers who form crucial voting blocs and, to a lesser extent, the social objective of making electricity affordable for the poor have led to a system of cross-subsidization where agricultural and domestic users pay low prices for electricity at the expense of industrial users. For instance, in 2000, industrial users in India paid about fifteen times the price paid by agricultural users for electricity (Government of India, 2002) . In a 2006 World Bank survey, Indian manufacturing firms were asked to indicate which element posed the biggest constraint to their operations out of a list of fifteen elements including electricity, access to finance, and corruption. Electricity was the most common major obstacle indicated, with more than 36% of firms listing electricity as their biggest constraint (World Bank, 2006) . Although the Indian government has undertaken steps to reduce the extent of cross-subsidization, industrial users still pay high prices for electricity relative to domestic and agricultural users, and to industrial users in other countries. 2 The potential for other variables to move in tandem with electricity prices presents a challenge in establishing a causal link between electricity cost and firm outcomes. To address this challenge, I construct an instrumental variable (IV) for electricity price based on the characteristics of electricity provision in India. Much of the electricity generated in India comes from thermal power plants, which use coal as the source of fuel. Thus, the price of coal affects the cost of generating electricity and, hence, its price. I use the price of coal paid by power utilities interacted with each Indian state's initial share of installed electricity generation capacity from coal-fired thermal power plants as an instrument for the electricity price firms in that state face. Using this instrument in an IV estimation, I find that firm behavior and performance respond to electricity prices. First, firms reduce their consumption of electricity and switch to less electricity-intensive production processes within narrowly defined industries in response to an increase in electricity price. 3 Second, firm output, machine intensity, and labor productivity fall with an increase in electricity price. Third, in addition to these level effects, I find that high electricity prices negatively affect firm productivity growth rates. These results together suggest that firms switch to less electricityintensive industries as a means of coping with high electricity costs and that this has negative implications for firm productivity growth. Using 2008 aggregate data for India and my regression estimates, I show that if the amount industrial users paid to subsidize electricity use by domestic and agricultural users had been reduced by as little as 10%, India's aggregate manufacturing output would have increased by 2% or 140 billion rupees, which could easily have covered the amount of the subsidies. This paper makes two contributions to the existing literature. First, to my knowledge, this is the first paper that studies how access to electricity can affect the types of industries in which firms choose to operate. Although there is a small development literature on the effects of electricity provision on firms (see, e.g., Reinikka & Svensson, 2002; Rud, 2012a Rud, , 2012b Alby et al., 2013; Fisher-Vanden et al., 2015; Allcott et al., 2016) , there has not yet been research on the potential effect of electricity constraints on firms' industry choices. Reinikka and Svensson (2002) find that electricity shortages reduce investment; Rud (2012a) finds that an expansion in the electricity network leads to an increase in manufacturing output; Allcott et al. (2016) show that electricity shortages reduce firms' revenues but have smaller impacts on productivity losses; and Fisher-Vanden et al. (2015) find that firms shift from making to buying their intermediate inputs in response to electricity shortages. Rud (2012b) and Alby et al. (2013) find that firms that adopt power generators are larger and more productive. A missing outcome in this literature is firms' industry choices. Understanding the impact of electricity on firms' industry and hence technology choices is important as this may have implications for firms' growth. I attempt to fill this gap in the literature in this paper.
Second, the existing firm-level studies in the development literature have largely focused on the provision of electricity without emphasis on how the price of electricity may play a crucial role in firms' decisions and performance. 4 In contrast, I analyze the extent to which, even with the availability of electricity, its cost may cause firms to change their production patterns in favor of less electricity-reliant technologies, which may have consequences for firm productivity growth. The cross-subsidization of electricity by industrial users, which has led to high prices for firms, is not peculiar to India. Several developing countries, including South Africa, Colombia, Honduras, and Ukraine, face this pricing distortion. 5 Thus, the findings of this paper contribute to our understanding of electricity-related constraints to development.
The findings of this paper also add to a recent strand of literature on the interactions among firm-level distortions, resource misallocation, and productivity differences. For India in particular, Hsieh and Klenow (2014) argue that a particular type of resource misallocation, namely, barriers facing large firms, can discourage firms from making productivity-enhancing investments and may be the reason firms in India exhibit little growth as they age. An important 4 In the context of developed countries, some papers have investigated the pricing of electricity for manufacturing firms. Davis, Grim, and Haltiwanger (2008) find that within a given industry, U.S. manufacturing firms that pay higher electricity prices are more energy efficient, while Davis et al. (2013) examine the factors that determine the pricing of electricity for U.S. manufacturing firms.
5 See Di Bella et al. (2015) , Steyn (n.d.) , and Chepeliev (2014) .
question raised in their paper is what exactly are the barriers that large plants in India face. My findings suggest that high electricity cost may be one of them. Indian firms may have no incentive to move to productivity-enhancing industries with high levels of technological sophistication and electricity reliance and grow larger since doing so comes with the cost of having to rely on exorbitantly priced electricity. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief overview of the electricity sector in India. Section III describes the data. Section IV outlines the empirical strategy and presents the results. Section V concludes.
II. Electricity Sector in India
Each state in India is responsible for the generation, distribution, and pricing of electricity for its residents. Electricity generation in India is mostly from thermal plants, which account for about 84% of the electricity generated in the country. Hydroelectric plants account for about 14% of electricity generation, while plants using nuclear energy, wind, and other renewable resources account for the rest. The dominant fuel for the thermal power plants is coal, which accounts for about 83% of installed thermal generation capacity (Government of India, 2012). The cost of coal can account for about 66% of the total cost of power production in coal-fired thermal power plants (Government of India, 2006) . The share of a state's installed generation capacity that comes from coal-fired thermal power plants is determined in large part by the state's proximity to India's coal mines. As shown in the map in figure B1 in online appendix B, states that are located near coal mines are more likely to have a higher share of their installed generation capacity coming from coal-fired thermal power plants.
Almost all of the coal used in India is produced by two central government-owned companies: Coal India Limited, which produces about 80% of the coal consumed in the country, and Singareni Collieries Company Limited, which produces about 8% (Government of India, 2008a). 6 These two companies set the price of coal and revise prices from time to time. Price revisions are driven mainly by cost pressures rather than changes in coal demand. The companies' reasons for revising prices have included offsetting inflationary pressures on their costs, offsetting increases in their wage bill, and achieving parity between domestic and international coal prices, which are much higher than Indian domestic coal prices. The coal companies set separate prices for power utilities and other categories of consumers. Figure 1 shows how the coal price paid by power utilities has changed over time. The large increase in 2005 coincided with a sharp spike 6 Of the remaining 12%, 5% is produced by captive coal mines and other private coal mining companies, and 7% is imported (Government of India, 2008a). For power utilities, 94% of their total coal consumption comes from the two central government-owned companies, Coal India Limited and Singareni Collieries Company Limited; 3% comes from captive coal mines, and the remainder comes from coal imports (Government of India, 2008b , 2008c . in global coal prices. Although India engages in very little international trade of coal (India exports only about 1% of its coal, and coal imports account for only 7% of total coal consumption in the country), the coal companies took advantage of the spike in global coal prices to increase the Indian coal prices. Figure B2 in online appendix B shows the consumption of coal by thermal power plants over time. Comparing this chart to the chart of coal prices paid by power utilities in figure 1 , the price setting of the coal companies does not appear to be in response to coal demand by the power utilities, alleviating the concern that the exclusion restriction would not be met if changes in electricity consumption and, hence, generation and power utilities' demand for coal were driving the changes in the price of coal. For instance, as shown in figure B2 , although coal consumption increased substantially between 2006 and 2008, coal prices remained fairly stable over this period, as shown in figure 1. Also, in table B1 in online appendix B, I check whether changes in coal prices were correlated with political factors or the performance of the manufacturing sector. I find no evidence of any strong correlations. The electricity that residents of a state use comes from one or more of four sources. Power plants owned by the state's government provide the bulk of electricity used, with other states' power plants, the central government's power plants, and independent power producers providing the remainder. States' power plants produce about 60% of total electricity generated in the country. Each state determines the price paid for electricity by its residents regardless of the electricity source. Electricity pricing in India is generally based on an incremental block tariff structure in which the marginal price of electricity increases with the amount consumed. As an example, table B2 in online appendix B shows the electricity price list for the state of Karnataka. For example, the first 100,000 kilowatt-hours of electricity consumed by industrial users cost 3.5 rupees per kilowatt-hour, while consumption above 100,000 kilowatt-hours costs 3.75 rupees per kilowatthours. Data on electricity prices are from Government of India (1999, 2002, 2011a) . Data on average cost of electricity supply are from the Indiastat database (http://www.indiastat.com).
The electricity sector in India is characterized by a system of cross-subsidization between agricultural and domestic users, on one hand, and industrial users, on the other. The former group pays low prices for electricity at the expense of the latter group, which faces high electricity prices, although the cost of supplying electricity to the latter group is lower. For instance, in India, electricity consumption by agricultural users for extracting groundwater with electric pumpsets for irrigation is largely unmetered. These users are charged a low flat rate for electricity based on the capacity of their pumpsets. This practice makes the marginal cost of using electricity essentially zero for farmers and has been criticized for leading to the excessive use of electricity and the depletion of groundwater. The catering of politicians to farmers who form dominant voting blocs and, to a lesser extent, the social objective of providing affordable services for the poor have contributed to the system of cross-subsidization. Figure 2 shows the average electricity prices paid by various categories of users in India and the power utilities' average cost of electricity supply between 1997 and 2010. The price paid by industrial users for electricity has consistently been much higher than that paid by agricultural and domestic users. In addition, electricity prices for industrial users have remained significantly above the average cost of electricity supply. Agricultural and domestic user prices have remained substantially below the average cost even though the cost of supplying power to industrial users is generally lower than the cost of supplying power to other users.
In an effort to correct this price distortion, the government passed a law in 2003 that required states to set up electricity regulatory commissions whose main responsibility was to ensure fair pricing of electricity and to rid the price-setting process of any political interference. Although most states have set up these commissions, a high level of cross-subsidization still exists. As recently as 2011, the average prices (in rupees per kilowatt-hour) paid by agricultural and domestic users were 1.23 and 3, respectively, compared to 4.78 for industrial users (Government of India, 2011a). Despite being poorer than the average OECD country, India's average electricity price for industrial users, at about 11 cents per kilowatt-hour, is about the same as the OECD average industrial electricity price. But at about 7 cents per kilowatthour, India's average electricity price for domestic users is less than half of the OECD average domestic price (IEA, 2012) .
III. Data
My analysis is based on manufacturing firm-level panel data from the Indian Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) 7 for the years 2001 to 2008. 8 The ASI is an annual survey of registered factories in India and covers about 30,000 firms each year. All factories are required to register if they have ten or more workers and use electricity, or if they do not use electricity but have at least twenty workers. This population of factories is divided into two categories: a census sector and a sample sector. The census sector consists of all large factories and all factories in states classified as industrially backward by the government. 9 For the 2001 to 2005 surveys, large factories were defined as those with 200 or more workers. From the 2006 survey onward, the definition was changed to those with 100 or more workers. All factories in the census sector are surveyed each year. The remaining factories make up the sample sector, of which a third is randomly selected each year for the survey. Over the 2001 to 2008 period, on average, firms in the census sector appear in the data set for five years, while firms in the sample sector appear for three years. To ensure that my estimates are representative of the population of firms, I weight observations with the sampling multipliers provided with the data set. In the survey, firms report the quantity, in kilowatthours, of electricity purchased and consumed, its value in rupees, and the average price paid per kilowatt-hour of electricity. Firms also report the quantity, in kilowatt-hours, of electricity generated by the firm itself for its use. The survey also includes firm-level data on output, employment, capital, material inputs, and industry.
In the ASI, a firm's five-digit industry 10 in a given year corresponds to the product that accounts for the highest share of the firm's total output in that year. There are 530 fivedigit industries in the data set corresponding to 127 four-digit industries and 61 three-digit industries. As an example of the level of detail in the industry classification, table B3 in online appendix B lists the four-and five-digit industries within the three-digit industry code 151: "Production, Processing 7 Recent papers that have used this data set include Bollard, Klenow, and Sharma (2013) , Harrison, Martin, and Nataraj (2013) , Hsieh and Klenow (2014) and Allcott et al. (2016) . 8 A year in the data set corresponds to the Indian fiscal year, which runs from April 1 to March 31. For instance, the year 2001 refers to the fiscal year beginning on April 1, 2000, and ending on March 31, 2001. 9 The states classified as industrially backward are listed in online appendix A. 10 The five-digit industry codes are from India's National Industrial Classification (NIC) 1998. The NIC 1998 is identical to the ISIC Rev. 3 system up to the four-digit level.
and Preservation of Meat, Fish, Fruits, Vegetables, Oils and Fats."
For constructing the instrument for electricity price, I obtain data on coal prices from the Indian Ministry of Coal's 2011 Coal Directory of India and data on installed electricity generation capacity from the Indian Ministry of Power's annual reports for 1997-1998 and 2002-2003 . To reduce the influence of outliers, I winsorize the firm-level variables within each year by setting values below the 1st percentile to the value at the 1st percentile and values above the 99th percentile to the value at the 99th percentile. I deflate all monetary values using price indices from the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
To control for state-level characteristics in my regressions, I use data on state gross domestic product and population. 11 Table 1 presents some summary statistics of the firmlevel data disaggregated by firm size. 12 Firms rely on both purchased electricity and self-generated electricity. About 35% of firms generate some electricity, which, on average, accounts for about 7% of their total electricity consumption. Firms primarily use self-generation of electricity as a means of coping with electricity outages rather than with electricity prices since the cost per kilowatt-hour incurred by a firm in generating its own electricity in India is generally much higher than the price of electricity purchased from power utilities. For instance, based on a firm-level survey, it is estimated that for Indian manufacturing firms, the cost of generating their own electricity is 24% higher than the price paid for the electricity provided by power utilities (Bhattacharya & Patel, 2007) .
IV. Econometric Analysis

A. Empirical Strategy
A simple regression of a firm outcome on electricity price may yield inconsistent and biased estimates of the effect of electricity price due to the potential endogeneity of prices. This endogeneity may come from several sources. For instance, some firms may have managers who have the foresight to locate in states with low electricity prices, and these may also be the firms that perform well along other dimensions. To the extent that the unobserved firm characteristics that affect the electricity price firms pay and other outcomes are time invariant, controlling for firm fixed effects in the regressions would alleviate any endogeneity from this source. However, these unobserved firm characteristics may not be time invariant, making the solution described above insufficient for dealing with the endogeneity of electricity prices. For instance, firms may develop relationships with state governments over time that allow them to obtain favorable pricing of electricity through corruption. Additionally, changes in the electricity price in a state may be correlated with changes in other unobserved state variables that also affect firm outcomes. Another concern is the direction of causality. States may be changing electricity prices in response to changes in firms' patterns of electricity consumption. For instance, firms may switch to electricity-intensive industries and increase their demand of electricity for reasons unrelated to electricity prices. States may respond to this increased demand by increasing electricity prices, leading to a positive bias in OLS estimates. Alternatively, if firms reduce their purchases of electricity, states may increase electricity prices in order to generate enough revenue to sustain the cross-subsidization of farmers and households, leading to a negative bias in OLS estimates.
To address this concern about the potential endogeneity of electricity prices, I rely on an identification strategy that exploits the nature of electricity generation and the organization of the electricity sector in India. Since most of the electricity used in a state is generated by the state's own power plants, changes in the price paid by electricity users in the state will largely reflect changes in the cost of producing electricity in the state's power plants. As the primary mode of electricity generation in India is thermal generation using coal-fired power plants, the price of coal plays a critical role in the cost of electricity generation and, hence, electricity prices. As described in section II, coal prices are set independently by the two coal companies responsible for the production of coal in India. These companies set prices for power utilities and other users separately. Given the reliance on coal for electricity generation, I construct a variable equal to the interaction between the price of coal paid by power plants in a given year and the initial coalfired thermal share of a state's installed electricity generation capacity. 13 The initial coal-fired thermal share of electricity 13 I use the initial thermal share to avoid confounding effects from endogenous changes in the thermal share over time. Figure B3 in online appendix B shows that states' thermal shares have remained largely stable over time. With the exception of two states, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, the initial thermal share is as of 1998, which precedes the first year of the data used generation capacity is the ratio of the installed generation capacity, in kilowatts, of a state's coal-fired thermal power plants to the total installed capacity of all of the state's power plants. For a given state, the thermal share is defined as follows:
Thermal share = Generation capacity of power plants using coal Generation capacity of all power plants .
(1)
I then use the interaction variable as an instrument for the electricity price paid by a firm in IV regressions of firm outcomes on electricity prices. The instrument makes use of two sources of variation: the variation over time in coal prices and the variation across states in initial thermal shares. The validity of using this IV approach to establish a causal relationship between electricity prices and firm outcomes hinges on the instrumental variable satisfying two conditions. The first is that the instrument, the interaction between coal price and thermal generation share, should be correlated with electricity price, which I show in the first-stage regressions in section IVB. The second condition is that the instrument should affect the firm outcome of interest only by its effect on electricity price. Although there is no way of formally testing this second condition, I present some evidence that suggests that it holds.
The instrument consists of two parts: the price of coal paid by power utilities and the initial thermal share of a state's installed generation capacity. The price used in constructing the instrument is the price of coal paid by power utilities. Although some firms use coal as an input in their production, as discussed in section II, the coal prices set for power utilities by the coal companies are different from the coal prices firms pay. Therefore, arguably, other than through its in the analysis. There are no data on Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh prior to 2000 since these states were created in late 2000. Therefore, I use data from 2003, the earliest year for which data on installed generation capacity are available for these states. effect on electricity prices, the coal price power utilities pay should not influence firm outcomes. Figure B4 in online appendix B shows the movement of the coal price firms pay over time. The coal price firms pay follows a different pattern from that paid by power utilities. Relative to the stepwise increases in the coal price power utilities pay shown in figure 1 , the coal price firms pay exhibits a smoother increase over time. Nonetheless, I have firm-level data on coal inputs and so control for the value of coal the firm uses in some regressions. Only about 12% of firms in the sample consume any coal, and these firms are concentrated in three sectors: glass, ceramics, and cement; iron and steel; and paper. As a robustness check, in section IVG, I redo my analysis with a sample that excludes the firms in these three sectors, and the results are essentially unchanged. Also, as discussed in section II, changes in coal prices by the coal companies do not appear to be driven by political factors or the performance of the manufacturing sector. As noted in section II, the second part of the instrument, the initial thermal share of a state's installed generation capacity, is determined in large part by a state's proximity to India's coal mines and should be plausibly exogenous to firm outcomes conditional on controlling for state fixed effects. As a robustness check, in section IVG, I use the proximity to coal mines instead of thermal share to construct the instrument. The results are robust to using this instrument.
A potential concern is that the IV strategy would be invalidated if states exhibit trends that are correlated with both the instrument and firm outcomes. For instance, states with high thermal shares may follow different trends compared to other states. To explore this possibility, I regress the change between 1994 and 1998 (the year in which the thermal share is measured) in the log of state-level variables that reflect the economic environment and are possibly related to firm outcomes on the state's thermal share. The state-level variables I examine are state gross domestic product per capita and population. Table B4 in online appendix B reports the results of these regressions. The coefficients are small in magnitude and statistically insignificant, suggesting that states' thermal shares are not correlated with economic trends. However, as a precautionary step and because there may be trends in unobserved variables that are correlated with both firm outcomes and the instrument, I control for state time trends in the regressions.
The system of equations I estimate is as follows:
Equation (2) is the outcome equation of interest, where y isrt is an outcome for firm i in state s in region r in year t; Electricity Price isrt is the price in rupees paid by a firm per This table reports the coefficients from the first-stage regression for the log of electricity price. Significant at ***1%, **5%, *10%. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the state-year level. The value of firm coal consumption is measured in millions of rupees.
kilowatt-hour of electricity; X isrt is the value in rupees of coal used by a firm; S st is a vector of state-level variables, namely, the log of state GDP per capita and the log of state population; λ i is a firm fixed effect; η rt is a region-year effect; and δ s t is a state time trend. 14 Equation (3) is the first-stage regression equation in which the log of electricity price is regressed on the interaction between the state thermal share and the log of coal price and all the other covariates in the outcome equation. All regressions include firm fixed effects to account for time-invariant firm characteristics, which may simultaneously affect both the electricity price paid by firms and other firm outcomes. In the data set, firms do not change the state in which they are located, so the firm fixed effects also capture state fixed effects. I also control for region-year effects to absorb shocks that affect all firms in a particular region, as well as state-specific time trends. Thus, the coefficient of interest, β 1 , is an estimate of the change in an outcome for a given firm given a change in the electricity price paid by the firm.
B. First-Stage Regression
The results from the first-stage regression in equation (3) are presented in table 2. Since the instrument varies at the state-year level, all the standard errors in the IV regressions are clustered at this level to allow for correlations across firms in the same state in a given year. Column 1 shows the results from the first-stage regression without controlling for state time trends. The estimate of the coefficient on the instrument is positive and statistically different from 0 at the 1% level. In column 2, I control for state time trends. The coefficient remains positive and statistically significant but is smaller than the estimate in column 1. This suggests that the coal price trend is correlated with state-specific trends in other variables that vary with electricity prices. I therefore control for state time trends in the following regressions. In 14 A list of the states in each region is provided in online appendix A. column 3, I include state-level variables, namely, the log of state GDP per capita and the log of state population, as well as the value of coal consumed by the firm. The coefficient on the instrument changes little with the inclusion of these control variables. The results of the first-stage regressions indicate that as coal price rises, firms in states that rely on thermal electricity generation experience an increase in electricity price. In terms of magnitudes, the coefficient of 0.61 on the instrument in column 3 implies that, for instance, firms in Delhi, which has a thermal share of 57%, would experience a 0.3% increase in electricity price given a 1% increase in coal price, while firms in West Bengal, which has a thermal share of 94%, would experience a 0.6% increase in electricity price. This magnitude is plausible given that, as noted in section II, the cost of coal can account for about 66% of the total cost of power production in thermal power plants (Government of India, 2006).
C. Effect on Industry Choice and Product Mix
As electricity price rises, to become less dependent on expensive electricity, firms may change their production to focus on goods that are less electricity intensive. At the fivedigit level, industries within the same four-digit industry exhibit similarities in terms of their main inputs and final products. For instance, within the four-digit industry code 1512 (processing and preserving of fish and fish products), the five-digit industry code 15121 refers to the sun drying of fish, while code 15122 refers to the artificial dehydration of fish, which requires the use of electrically powered drying machines. Both industries use the same primary input, fish, and have the same end product, dried fish, but differ in terms of the processes used, with industry 15121 using a less electricity-intensive process. Given the similarities between five-digit industries within the same four-digit industry, we might expect that firms can switch between five-digit industries in response to changes in electricity price.
To explore this, I define the electricity intensity of a fivedigit industry as the average kilowatt-hours of electricity consumed per rupee of output by firms in that industry. 15 This corresponds to the standard measure of electricity intensity used by the International Energy Agency: the ratio of electricity consumption in kilowatt-hours to the value of output. 16 15 I define the five-digit electricity intensities using data from 1999, which precedes the first year of the data used in the analysis, to avoid confounding effects from endogenous changes in industries' electricity intensities over time. 16 To check the reliability of the electricity intensities calculated from the Indian data, I compare them to the electricity intensities of industries in the United Kingdom in figure B5 in online appendix B and find a strong positive and statistically significant relationship between the two sets of electricity intensities. The U.K. data are available at the four-digit industry level. The most disaggregated level at which electricity intensities for comparable industries are available for other countries is the four-digit level of the ISIC. Since the electricity intensities at the disaggregated five-digit industry level are available only from the Indian data, I rely on the Indian electricity intensities for my analysis.
In the ASI, a firm's five-digit industry in a given year corresponds to the product that accounts for the highest share of its total output in that year. The results from the regression of the log of the electricity intensity of a firm's five-digit industry on the log of electricity price are reported in panel A of table 3. Columns 1 and 2 present estimates from OLS regressions of equation (2). All standard errors in the OLS regressions are clustered at the firm level to allow for correlations across years within firms. Columns 3 and 4 present the reduced-form results, while columns 5 and 6 present the IV results correcting for the potential endogeneity of electricity prices. All the standard errors in the IV regressions are clustered at the state-year level to allow for correlations across firms in the same state in a given year. All regressions control for firm fixed effects, state time trends, and regionyear effects. In addition to these controls, the regressions in columns 2, 4, and 6 control for the log of state gross domestic product per capita, the log of state population, and the value of coal consumed by the firm. Note that with the IV specifications, the estimates are identifying the impacts of increases in the price of electricity driven by increases in the price of coal. The hypothesis that firms switch to less electricity-intensive industries as electricity price rises is supported by the negative and statistically significant relationship between the log of the electricity intensity of a firm's five-digit industry and the log of electricity price shown in columns 5 and 6. The coefficient of −0.7 in column 6 implies that in response to a 1% increase in electricity price, a firm switches to a five-digit industry whose electricity intensity is 0.7% lower than that of the firm's previous industry. To put this in perspective, for the 530 five-digit industries, the average percentage change in electricity intensity between an industry and the industry with the next highest electricity intensity is approximately 2%. Results from regressions where the outcome variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm switches to a less electricity-intensive five-digit industry are also shown in panel B of table 3 and are consistent with a shift toward less electricity-intensive industries as electricity prices rise. 17 17 Some studies have shown that firms do switch industries and products frequently. For instance, Bernard and Okubo (2015) find that about 20% of all firms change their product (six-digit Japanese Standard Industrial Classification) mix every year, and this increases by 25% during transitions from recessions to expansions. Even among single-product firms, the authors find that about 12% of firms change their product mix every year. They also find that about 26% of multiple-product firms switch industries (four-digit Japanese Standard Industrial Classification) every year. Other papers that have observed industry and product switching by firms include Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010), Goldberg et al. (2010a Goldberg et al. ( , 2010b , and Iacovone and Javorcik (2010) . Note that the industry switching observed in this paper is at a disaggregated level: the five-digit industry level of India's National Industrial Classification. Switching industries at a more aggregate level should be less feasible. I estimate regressions similar to those in panel A of table 3 using as dependent variables the log of the electricity intensity of a firm's three-and four-digit industries, respectively. The coefficients on the log of electricity price in these regressions are statistically insignificant, indicating that firms do not switch their three-or four-digit industry in response to changes in electricity price. This is perhaps not surprising since at the three-or four-digit levels, industries vary significantly in terms of the goods produced and inputs used, making it more difficult and less likely for firms to switch between industries at this level. For instance, within the This table reports the coefficients from the OLS, reduced-form, and IV regressions of the dependent variables on the log of electricity price. Significant at ***1%, **5%, *10%. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the state-year level except for the OLS regressions, which cluster standard errors at the firm level. The log of electricity price is instrumented with the interaction between a state's thermal share and the log of coal price. As noted above, a firm's five-digit industry in a given year in the ASI corresponds to the product that accounts for the highest share of the firm's total output in that year. Therefore, the result that firms are switching to a less electricityintensive five-digit industry indicates that firms are changing their main product but does not provide information about the firms' other products in the case of multiple-product firms. About 47% of the firms in the data set are multipleproduct firms, and the average number of products per firm is 2.14. 18 To get a sense of how a firm's product mix responds to changes in electricity prices, I calculate the average electricity intensity of a firm's product mix. I first define the electricity intensity of each product as the average kilowatt-hours of electricity consumed per rupee of output by single-product firms producing that product. 19 A caveat here is that since single-product firms may differ fundamentally from multiple-product firms (see, e.g., Bernard et al., 2010, and Goldberg et al., 2010a) , the product electricity two-digit industry code 15 (manufacture of food products and beverages), the three-digit industry code 151 refers to the production, processing, and preservation of meat, fish, fruits, vegetables, oils, and fats, while code 152 refers to the manufacture of dairy products. Also, within the three-digit industry code 151, the four-digit industry code 1511 refers to the production, processing, and preserving of meat and meat products, while code 1512 refers to the processing and preserving of fish and fish products, highlighting how the main inputs can differ even between two four-digit industries in the same three-digit industry. 18 In the ASI, firms are asked to list their top ten products in terms of their contribution to the firm's total output. Therefore, the number of products per firm is top-coded at ten. However, almost all the firms (98.6%) list fewer than ten products. Each product is identified by a unique code from India's Annual Survey of Industries Commodity Classification (ASICC). There are 4,452 product codes in the data set.
19 I define the product electricity intensities using data from 2001, the first year for which detailed product classification is available, to avoid confounding effects from endogenous changes in products' electricity intensities over time.
intensities calculated from data on single-product firms may not be the most valid measures. However, since the survey provides information on total electricity consumption only at the firm level and not at the product-firm level, it is not feasible to calculate the product electricity intensities using multiple-product firms. Using the measures of product electricity intensity obtained from the data on single-product firms, I calculate the average of the electricity intensities of each firm's products. I then regress the log of the average electricity intensity of a firm's product mix on the log of electricity price. Panel C of table 3 reports the results from these regressions. 20 The negative and statistically significant coefficient on the log of electricity price implies that firms alter their product mix in favor of products whose production processes are less electricity intensive in response to an increase in electricity price. However, it may be the case that although firms are including fewer electricity-intensive products in their product mix as electricity prices rise, highelectricity-intensity products still account for the bulk of their output. The result that firms are changing their main industry in response to changes in electricity prices suggests that this is not the case. To further check this, I look at the effect of electricity price on the weighted average product electricity intensity for a given firm in panel D of table 3, where the weights are the shares of each product in the firm's total output. In line with the result for the electricity intensity of a firm's five-digit industry, I find that firms are producing higher proportions of less electricityintensive products in response to an increase in electricity price. This table reports the coefficients from the OLS, reduced-form, and IV regressions of the dependent variables on the log of electricity price. Significant at ***1%, **5%, *10%. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the state-year level except for the OLS regressions, which cluster standard errors at the firm level. The log of electricity price is instrumented with the interaction between a state's thermal share and the log of coal price. The results of the first-stage regressions are reported in table 2 for panels A through D and in panel C of online appendix table B5 for panels E and F. Control variables include the value of coal used by the firm, the log of state GDP per capita, and the log of state population. Details on the construction of the total factor productivity measure, log(TFP(Olley-Pakes)), are provided in online appendix A.
D. Effect on Productivity
If electricity-intensive industries are indeed those that rely on productivity-enhancing technologies, then operating in a less electricity-intensive industry may affect firms' productivity growth. As most innovations in production processes are reliant on electricity, we might expect it to be the case that the electricity intensity of an industry is positively associated with both its technology intensity and productivity. To explore changes in productivity as a result of changes in electricity prices, I first analyze the relationship between labor productivity and electricity prices. Before turning to the effect of electricity prices on firm labor productivity, I look at the effect on firm output and employment separately. The IV results in panels A and B of table 4 imply that an increase in electricity price results in a reduction in output but no significant change in employment.
I present the results for the effect of electricity prices on labor productivity in panel C of table 4. As implied by the results for output and labor, labor productivity falls with an increase in electricity price. In addition to labor productivity, I also investigate the effect of electricity prices on a firm's total factor productivity (TFP). The measure of TFP, which I refer to as TFP (Olley-Pakes), has been widely used in the literature and is constructed following the method proposed in Olley and Pakes (1996) . 21 The results of the regressions for 21 I also construct TFP using three other methods that have been used in the literature. The first measure, which I refer to as TFP (LP), is constructed TFP are reported in panel D of table 4. Although negative, the coefficients on the log of electricity price are not statistically significant. However, measures of the level of TFP may be biased since they do not take into account firm heterogeneity in input and output quality and markups, and so the results for the level of TFP may not be reliable. To the extent that these biases are relatively constant over time, measures of TFP growth may be more accurate than measures of TFP levels. I examine TFP growth next. Nonetheless, measures of TFP growth are not bias free, and so these results should still be interpreted with caution.
In addition to the level effects on productivity, changes in electricity prices may have growth effects on firms. In section IVC, I showed that a negative relationship exists between electricity prices and the electricity intensity of the industry in which firms choose to operate. If these electricity-intensive industries are arguably more technologically advanced, then switching to such industries may give firms the opportunity to use more advanced technologies. If these technologically advanced industries generate more opportunities for learning and further innovation than the following the method in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) . The second measure, TFP (OLS), is the residual from industry-specific OLS regressions of the log of output on the logs of labor, capital, and firm inputs. The final measure, TFP (Solow), is constructed using the Solow accounting method. Details on the construction of the TFP measures are provided in online appendix A. The results of the regressions using these alternative measures of TFP are reported in table B7 of online appendix B. This table reports the coefficients from the OLS, reduced-form, and IV regressions of the dependent variables on the log of electricity price. Significant at ***1%, **5%, *10%. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the state-year level except for the OLS regressions, which cluster standard errors at the firm level. The log of electricity price is instrumented with the interaction between a state's thermal share and the log of coal price. The results of the first-stage regressions are reported in table 2. Control variables include the value of coal used by the firm, the log of state GDP per capita, and the log of state population. less technologically advanced industries, then switching to such industries may subsequently have a positive effect on firm productivity growth. To explore this possibility, I run regressions of a firm's productivity growth rate between time t − 1 and time t on electricity price at time t − 1. I calculate the growth rate of a firm's outcome as the log difference between the firm outcome this year and the previous year. These regressions include only firms that appear in the data set in consecutive years and therefore may be biased toward large firms since the Annual Survey of Industries is a census of large firms and contains only a random sample of smaller firms. Since large firms may behave differently from smaller ones, a caveat here is that these growth results may not be representative of the population of firms. Summary statistics for the subset of firms used in the growth regressions are shown in table B6 in online appendix B.
The estimates for the effect of electricity price on productivity growth are reported in panels E and F of table 4. While an increase in electricity price results in a decline in the growth rate of TFP, the impact on the growth rate of labor productivity, although negative, is not statistically significant.
E. Potential Channels
In this section, I investigate potential channels through which changes in electricity prices result in the impacts on the electricity intensity of production and productivity found in the previous sections. An immediate channel should be changes in the use of electricity by firms in response to changes in electricity prices. Table 5 reports results on the effects of electricity prices on electricity consumption, in kilowatt-hours, by firms. The statistically significant negative coefficients on the log of electricity price in panel A suggest that firms reduce the quantity, in kilowatthours, of electricity purchased as electricity price increases. As indicated by the coefficients in columns 5 and 6, a 1% increase in electricity price leads to about a 1.2% fall in the quantity of electricity purchased by firms. This estimate of the price elasticity of electricity demand is closely in line with the range (−1.25 to −1.94) found for industrial consumers in the existing literature (Iimi, 2010) .
If firms are able to generate enough electricity to offset the reduction in the quantity of electricity purchased, there may not be a reduction in the quantity of electricity they use. However, as discussed in section III, firms primarily use self-generation to mitigate the effects of outages rather than prices since it is much costlier for firms to generate their own electricity than it is to purchase electricity from the power utilities. It is therefore unlikely that firms would increase self-generation of electricity in response to an increase in electricity price.
In panel B of table 5, the coefficients from regressing the log of the total quantity of electricity used by the firm, both purchased and self-generated, on the log of electricity price are negative and statistically significant. This result confirms the hypothesis that firms are not able to use self-generation to offset the reduction in the quantity of electricity purchased and therefore experience a reduction in their total electricity consumption. To further explore the effect, if any, of electricity price on the self-generation of electricity, panels C and D of table 5 report estimates from regressions of an indicator variable for self-generation and the generated share of electricity on the log of electricity price. The coefficients indicate that firms do not increase the self-generation of electricity in response to increases in electricity prices. This table reports the coefficients from IV regressions of the dependent variables on the log of electricity price and its interaction with a dummy for multiple-product firms. Significant at ***1%, **5%, *10%. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the state-year level. The log of electricity price and its interaction with a dummy variable for multiple-product firms are instrumented with interactions among a state's thermal share, the log of coal price, and a dummy variable for multiple-product firms. The results of the first-stage regressions are reported in panel B. Control variables include the value of coal used by the firm, the log of state GDP per capita, and the log of state population.
If firms are reducing their use of electricity in response to high electricity prices, then one would expect that they are also reducing their use of machinery that tends to be reliant on electricity. I investigate this in panel E of table 5. The negative and statistically significant coefficients on the log of electricity price in the IV regressions suggest that firms become less machine intensive as electricity prices increase.
To address the issue of using the same instrument for multiple comparisons, I use the Holm-Bonferroni correction (Holm, 1979) to assess the significance of my results. In table B8 in online appendix B, I report the unadjusted p-values from the IV regressions with control variables, as well as the p-values adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing using the Holm-Bonferroni correction. 22 Each panel in the table corresponds to a family of outcomes for the same sample. After using the Holm-Bonferroni correction, all the previously statistically significant coefficients remain so. 22 The adjusted p-value is calculated as p(n − k − 1) where n is the number of hypotheses tested in the family and k is the ordered rank of the unadjusted p-values (from smallest p-value to largest p-value).
F. Multiple-Product versus Single-Product Firms
I examine whether the responses of multiple-product firms to changes in electricity prices differ from those of single-product firms in table 6. I include an interaction between the log of electricity price and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm produces more than one product in the initial year the firm appears in the data set. As instruments for the log of electricity price and this interaction variable, I use interactions among the log of coal price, the state's thermal generation share, and a dummy variable for multiple-product firms. The coefficients on the interaction term indicate that multiple-product firms experience a lower percentage reduction in electricity usage, output, and productivity relative to single-product firms when electricity prices rise. These results suggest that while multiple-product firms may be able to cope with increases in electricity prices by reoptimizing among their products, single-product firms may be forced to respond by cutting output.
G. Robustness Checks
In this section, I test the robustness of my results to different specifications. In column 2 of table B9 in online appendix B, I test the robustness of the results to the exclusion of the value of coal used by the firm as a control variable. For comparison purposes, column 1 of table B9 presents the previous results, which included this control variable. The results in columns 1 and 2 are essentially the same, implying that the results are robust to the exclusion of the value of coal used by the firm.
A potential concern is that coal prices may be correlated directly with power outages, independent of electricity prices, and hence the IV regressions may be picking up the effects of power outages and not the effects of electricity prices per se. However, as shown in table B10 in online appendix B, coal-related issues are not a common cause of outages in India. Coal-related issues accounted for between 0.8% and 4.1% of kilowatt-hours of generation lost in thermal power plants due to outages over the period 2001 to 2008. I do not have state-level data on outages. However, I have state-level data on the plant load factor of thermal power plants. 23 The plant load factor is the ratio of actual electricity generation to the maximum possible generation of power plants and is negatively correlated with outages. I therefore control for the log of the state-level plant load factor in the regressions in column 3 of table B9 to proxy for the extent of outages in the state. The results are very similar to the original results reported in column 1. In column 4 of table B9, I include both the value of coal used by the firm and the log of the state-level plant load factor as control variables. The results are again very similar to the original results.
An argument made in section IVA to support the validity of the identification strategy was that the coal price used in the instrument is set specifically for power utilities and is different from the coal price firms pay. Therefore, this coal price should not affect firm outcomes other than through its effect on electricity price. To further alleviate any concern that the coal price used in the instrument may affect firm outcomes directly since some firms use coal as an input, I controlled for the value of coal used by the firm in some regressions. As another check that my results are not being driven by a violation of the exclusion restriction, I redo my analysis with a sample that excludes firms in sectors that are heavily dependent on coal. The manufacturing sectors that are the largest consumers of coal are the glass, ceramics, and cement industry; the iron and steel industry; and the paper industry. 24 These three sectors have the highest proportions of coal as a share of inputs in the data set. Column 5 of table B9 presents the main results for the sample that excludes firms in these three sectors. The conclusions from above still hold.
Since the share of a state's installed generation capacity that comes from coal-fired thermal power plants is determined in large part by the state's proximity to India's coal mines (see figure 1) , as a robustness check, I redo the analysis using the interaction between a state's proximity to the nearest coal mine and coal price as the instrument for electricity price. I define proximity as the inverse of the log of the distance from a state to the nearest coal mine such that an increase in this measure implies closer proximity to a coal mine. 25 The results from this analysis are reported in column 6 of table B9 and closely mirror the conclusions from the original results.
The results may be driven by a change in the composition of firms if entry and exit are other dimensions along which firms respond to changes in electricity prices. Given the design of the ASI, I can only observe entry and exit of firms in the census sector. I find no significant effects on entry or exit of this subset of firms. 26 To further assess whether the results are driven by firm entry and exit, I run the regressions for a balanced panel of firms. A caveat is that given the design of the ASI, the balanced panel will consist of firms in the census sector, which are the larger firms. The results from the analysis for the balanced panel are reported in column 7 of table B9, and the directions of the impacts are consistent with the results for the full sample.
H. Estimate of Aggregate Output Loss
An observed pattern in India's manufacturing sector is that firms grow very little as they age (Hsieh & Klenow, 2014) . Explanations put forth for the poor performance of the manufacturing sector have included, among others, the country's restrictive labor market regulations. The findings of this paper suggest that electricity constraints may also contribute to the observed growth pattern. I find that high electricity prices have negative consequences for firm output and growth, and these high prices may therefore be suppressing the expansion of India's manufacturing sector. My analysis suggests that even a small step toward achieving fairer pricing of electricity for industrial users could result in significant gains in manufacturing output.
As an example, industrial users were charged about an extra 89 billion rupees to cover electricity subsidies to agricultural and domestic users in 2008. Electricity consumption by industrial users in that year was 157 giga-kilowatt-hours, at a price of 4.16 rupees per kilowatt hour, equivalent to total sales of 653 billion rupees (Government of India, 2011a). Therefore, about 14% of the total electricity revenue from industrial users was for the purpose of covering subsidies to agricultural and domestic users. If these subsidies had been reduced by as little as 10% (8.9 billion rupees), electricity prices for industrial users could have been reduced by 1.4%. My results imply that a 1% fall in electricity price leads to about a 1.5% 27 increase in firm output. Hence, the 25 The distance is the Euclidean distance from the center of a state to the tip of the nearest coal mine calculated using data from Trippi and Tewalt (2011) . 26 The results for entry and exit are available on request. 27 This estimate is from the coefficient from the IV regression of the log of output on the log of electricity price in column 6 of table 4.
1.4% reduction in electricity price could have resulted in about a 2% increase in output. India's aggregate manufacturing output in 2008 was 7.3 trillion rupees (Government of India, 2011b). The estimated 2% increase in output would therefore have meant about an additional 140 billion rupees of output, which could easily have covered the 8.9 billion rupee reduction in subsidies.
The existing literature has largely focused on the negative impacts of power shortages. For instance, estimates from a recent paper on India's power shortages (Allcott et al., 2016) suggest that a 1 percentage point increase in power shortages in India reduces manufacturing output by about 1.1%. My estimates suggest that distortions in the pricing of electricity may also have dire consequences for output and, hence, in addition to addressing power shortages, addressing these distortions should be a policy focus.
V. Conclusion
Drawing on Indian firm-level data, this paper analyzes the effect of electricity price on the type of industry in which firms choose to operate and the implications for their productivity growth. Addressing the potential endogeneity of electricity prices by exploiting the nature of electricity generation in India, I show that firms respond to increases in electricity prices by shifting to products with less electricity-intensive production processes. I provide evidence that an increase in electricity price has negative consequences for firm output, labor productivity, and machine intensity. In addition to these level effects, I find that firm productivity growth rates are negatively affected by increases in electricity prices. Taken together, these results suggest that high electricity prices cause firms to operate in low-electricity-intensity industries and hence forgo the productivity-enhancing opportunities available in more electricity-intensive and, arguably, more technologically advanced industries.
The results of this paper shed light more broadly on the literature on productivity growth in developing countries. The findings highlight a channel through which infrastructure constraints may affect firm productivity. Faced with infrastructure constraints-in this case, high electricity prices-firms may use less efficient production processes in an attempt to become less reliant on that infrastructure. Although this paper addresses electricity specifically, one can imagine ways in which firms may change their processes in potentially undesirable ways to cope with other infrastructure constraints.
Additionally, while most of the literature on infrastructure constraints in developing countries has focused on the availability of infrastructure, this paper emphasizes the importance of considering the affordability of infrastructure as well. Even with the provision of infrastructure, high prices may instigate coping strategies that have negative consequences.
A limitation of my analysis is that I do not directly observe data on the technologies used by firms, which are generally absent from most firm-level data sets. Future data collection efforts could elicit such information from firms. Given the important role of technology in growth, such data would allow more in-depth analyses of the factors influencing firms' technology choices and how these choices shape productivity growth in developing countries.
